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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JUAN ANTHONY PORTILLO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940387-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for distribution
and/or arranging to distribute marijuana, two enhanced second
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-378(1) (a) (ii) and 58-37-8(1) (b) (Supp. 1995), and one third degree
felony for the same under section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii); possession
with intent to distribute marijuana, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1995);
failure to obtain drug tax stamps, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-103 and 59-19-104 (1992);
and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly voir dire the jury

venire concerning the applicable penalties and amy potential
penalty bias they might have?
Defendant acknowledges that this issue was not raised
below; consequently, the issue may not be reviewed on appeal
unless defendant can establish plain error.

This requires

error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful.

If any one

of these elements is missing, there can be no finding of plain
error,"

State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah 1994)

(citations omitted).

Accord State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170,

174 (Utah App. 1992).
2.

Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that

it could not convict defendant for the enhanced drug offenses
charged in counts II and III of the information, unless it first
determined that those offenses constituted second or subsequent
violations of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1995)?
Defendant acknowledges that this issue was similarly
not raised below; accordingly, the plain error standard applies
here as well.
3.

Does the claimed cumulative effect of the above

alleged errors require reversal?
Whether the cumulative effect of claimed individual
errors requires reversal turns on whether the errors as a whole
undermine confidence in the outcome.

State v. Palmer, 86 0 P.2d

339, 350 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993).
4.
counsel?

Was defendant effectively assisted by trial

When reviewed solely upon the trial record, appellate

review for counsel effectiveness is necessarily conducted de
novo;

however,

,f

[jJudicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must

be highly deferential."

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

689 (1984) . See also State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah
2

App. 1993) ("td]espite the application of a standard normally
bereft of deference, appellate review of counsel's performance
must be highly deferential").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The pertinent portion of the drug statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1995), is contained in Addendum C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with various felony drug related
offenses including several counts of distributing and/or
arranging to distribute marijuana and singular counts of
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, failure to obtain
drug tax stamps, and possession of paraphernalia (R. 1-2).
Following a jury trial held September 20-21, 1993,
defendant was convicted as charged (R. 108-07).
The trial court sentenced defendant to two terms of
from one to 15 years; three terms of not more than five years;
and one six month term (R. 117-14).

All terms were to run

concurrently and defendant received credit for time served.

Id.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On three different dates in October 1991, the Utah
County Narcotics Enforcement Task Force set up controlled buys of
marijuana from defendant at his Provo, Utah, residence (Tr. Vol.
I at 65-86, 103, 122-41, 211, 265-69).

The controlled buys were

arranged and conducted by then confidential informant, George
Quintana, defendant's former roommate, using cash supplied to him
by the task force (Tr. Vol. I at 74, 209-14).
3

According to task

force procedure, Quintana's person and vehicle were searched
before and after each controlled buy (Tr. Vol. I at 65, 211-212).
Following the first and second controlled buys, conducted on
October 9th and October 15th, Quintana produced 1/8 ounce baggies
of marijuana which he had purchased from defendant for
approximately $40 (Tr. Vol. I at 71-74, 127, 212).
Approximately one hour after the third and last
controlled buy, on October 25, 1991, investigating officers
obtained and executed a search warrant for defendant's residence
(Tr. Vol. I at 86). Defendant was the only person inside the
residence at the time the search was conducted.

Id.

The

searching officers seized the money defendant had just received
from Quintana in exchange for marijuana (Tr. Vol. I at 113-114,
150), two sets of scales and other paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets,
three baggies each containing approximately two grams of crushed
marijuana, and a box containing approximately 41 grams of crushed
marijuana (Tr. Vol. II at 277-78).

The above described

controlled buys form the basis for the drug distribution offenses
charged in counts I-III.
At trial, defendant claimed that he could not have been
involved in any of the controlled buys because he was out of town
from September 24, 1991 to October 20, 1991, when he returned
briefly before departing again later that day and that he did not
return to Provo until approximately 20 minutes before his arrest
on October 25, 1991 (Tr. Vol. II at 321-22, 327). Defendant

4

claimed that he left Quintana in charge of his house and van
while he was gone (Tr. Vol. II at 324).
Defendant further claimed that the seized scales and
buy-owe sheets related to his business selling fruits and
vegetables, particularly, chili peppers (Tr. Vol. II at 379,
386).

As for the seized marijuana, defendant claimed that it

belonged to Quintana and other individuals that he let stay in
his house, and that he had not previously noticed any marijuana
inside the house (Tr. Vol. II at 331-33).

Finally, defendant

claimed that the money seized from his person was rent money,
left for him by the above-mentioned individuals (Tr. Vol. II at
332).

The jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 108-07).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGDMENT
POINT I
Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred in

two instances.

First, by informing the jury venire of the

potential penalties.

This claim fails because it is well

established that voir dire examination has as its proper purposes
both the detection of actual bias, and the collection of data to
permit informed exercise of the peremptory challenge.

Thus, the

trial court's venire voir dire in this case afforded the parties
an opportunity to explore whether any venire member held a
particular penalty bias that would interfere with the reaching of
an impartial verdict.

So viewed, the trial court's voir dire

does not constitute error, let alone obvious error.

Further, the

trial court instructed the subsequently impaneled jury that it
5

was not to consider the potential penalties in arriving at a
verdict, defeating any assertion of prejudice.

Defendant's claim

can be rejected on any one of the above grounds.
POINT II
Second, defendant claims that elements instructions
##4-5 are plainly erroneous because they require the jury to find
that counts II and/or III constitute prior violations
statute instead of prior convictions

of the drug

consistent with the precise

wording of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (b) (Supp. 1995).

He

further claims the instructions are plainly erroneous because
they require the jury to convict for count I as an element of
counts II and/or III.

In the first instance, there is no

requirement that jury instructions must precisely track the
pertinent statutory language; rather, the precise wording and
specificity of jury instructions is soundly left to the trial
court's discretion.

Moreover, State v. Hunt, No. 940267, slip

op. at 4 (Utah November 9, 1995), clarifies that the term
conviction as used in section 58-37-8(1)(b) means not a
of conviction, but rather a detennination
or plea.

of guilt

by a

judgment
verdict

In light of this clarification, defendant articulates

no compelling reason that the term violation cannot be reasonably
interchanged for the term conviction as it used in 58-37-8(1) (b).
In the second instance, error, if any, in requiring the
jury to convict for count I as an element of counts II and/or
count III was favorable error.

Indeed, in so requiring,

instructions ##4-5 enumerated more elements for conviction than
€

the drug statute otherwise required and thereby increased the
likelihood of acquittal on counts II and/or III if the jury could
not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was also
guilty of count I.

Without this additional element, the jury was

free to convict defendant for counts II and/or III regardless of
its determination to convict, or not, for count I.

Thus, neither

of the above claims demonstrate any instance of prejudicial
error.
Point III
Additionally, defendant claims that even if the above
alleged errors are not individually harmful, their cumulative
prejudicial effect requires reversal.

The Court should reject

defendant's claim of cumulative error for failure to support it
with any meaningful analysis and to establish that any one of the
above allegations constitutes error.
Point IV
Finally, as an alternative means for reviewing his
allegations of plain error in Points I and II defendant asserts
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the trial court's venire voir dire and elements instructions.
Because the plain error and ineffective assistance standards both
require a showing of prejudice which is not made out here,
defendant is unable to succeed under his ineffective assistance
theory for the same reasons he is unable to succeed under a plain
error theory.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT
THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED WHEN IT
INFORMED THE JURY VENIRE OF THE
POTENTIAL PENALTIES FOR THE CHARGED
OFFENSES DURING ITS VOIR DIRE OF THE
JURY VENIRE; INDEED, THE TRIAL COURT
INSTRUCTED THE SUBSEQUENTLY IMPANELED
JURY NOT TO CONSIDER THE POTENTIAL
PENALTIES IN ARRIVING AT THEIR
VERDICT AND THEREBY CURED ANY
ARGUABLE PREJUDICE
Defendant complains that the trial court committed
plain error during its voir dire of the jury venire by informing
the venire of the penalties applicable to the charged offenses.
Because defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court
erred, let alone that the alleged error was obvious and
prejudicial, the Court should reject his claim.

State v.

Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah 1994).
A.

Proceedings Below

During the course of venire voir dire the trial court
instructed the prospective jurors as follows:
THE COURT: Thank you. I've advised
you that this is a drug case. And I
will, on the record once again,
advise you of the nature of the
charges involved.
Count 1 is distribution or arranging
to distribute a controlled substance.
That's a third-degree felony. That's
punishable by incarceration in the
Utah State Prison for an
indeterminate period of time, not to
exceed five years, together with up
to a $5,000 find and/or both-8

Count 2, ladies and gentlemen, is
distribution of or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance.
That's a second-degree felony. It's
also punishable by an indeterminate
time at the Utah State Prison, not
less than one nor more than 15 years
in the Utah State Prison, together
with up to a $10,000 fine and/or
both.
Count 3 is distribution of or
arranging to distribute a controlled
substance, also a second-degree
felony. It would carry a maximum,
also, for an indeterminate time, not
less than one nor more than 15 years
in the Utah State Prison together
with a fine not to exceed $10,000
and/or both.
Count 4 is possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to
distribute. That's a third-degree
felony, carrying the possible
imposition of an indeterminate time
from zero to five years in the Utah
State Prison together with a fine up
to $5,000 and/or both.
Count 5 is unlawful possession or use
of drug paraphernalia. That's a
class-B misdemeanor. It's punishable
by incarceration in the Utah County
Jail for a period not to exceed six
months together with a fine up to
$1,000 and/or both.
And Count 6 is illegal drug tax.
That's a third degree felony. That's
also punishable by an indeterminate
time in the Utah State Prison not to
exceed five years together with a
fine up to $5,000 and/or both.
(Tr. Vol. I at 14-17) (the pertinent transcript pages are
contained in addendum A ) .
Additionally, the trial court informed members of the
jury venire that they were to be the "exclusive triers of the
9

i

fact(s)," and that they would also make the ultimate
"determination about credibility of witnesses" (Tr. Vol. I at
17), see addendum A.

The court then proceeded to voir dire the

venire and specifically inquired if any venire member

f!

believ[ed]

that the punishment fixed by law is too severe or too light for
the offenses charged?" (Tr. Vol. I at 34), see addendum A.

No
i

venire person audibly responded to the court's question and
defendant raised no objection.

Id.

Finally, in its formal instructions to the ultimately
impaneled jury, the trial court cautioned:
In arriving at a verdict in this
case, you shall not discuss nor
consider the subject of penalty or
punishment, as that is a matter which
lies with the court, and other court
proceedings. The penalty and
punishment for the crime charged must
not in any way affect your decision
as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.
(R. 78) (a copy of the above instruction is contained in addendum
A) .
B.

Plain Error Standard

As acknowledged by defendant in his brief, he did not
object to the trial court's handling of the venire voir dire, nor
did he object to the adequacy of the court's instructions to the
subsequently impaneled jury.

Br. of App. at 14. As further

acknowledged by defendant, his failure to object below precludes
an appellate challenge unless he is able to demonstrate plain
error.

Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403. To establish plain error,

defendant must show that 1) the trial court erred, 2) the alleged
10

error should have been obvious, and 3) the alleged error was
harmful because it undermines this Court's confidence in the
verdict ultimately rendered.

Id.: State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d

170, 174 (Utah App. 1992).
C.

Proper Venire Voir Dire

Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court
committed error under the first prong of the plain error
analysis.

Although a sitting jury is not generally instructed

concerning the penalty to be imposed upon a guilty defendant in a
non-capital,1 and/or a non-insanity defense case such as this,
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 296 (Utah 1988), the trial
court's mention of, and inquiry concerning the applicable
penalties for purposes of venire voir dire does not constitute
error.
Indeed, it is well established that venire "voir dire
examination has as its proper purposes both the detection of
actual bias, and the collection of data to permit informed
exercise of the peremptory challenge."

State v. Tavlor, 664 P.2d

439, 447 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted).

Accord Commonwealth v.

White, 531 A.2d 806, 808-09 (Pa.Super. 1987) ("Voir dire
questions are asked to determine whether a prospective juror "is
willing and able to eliminate the influence of any scruples and
render a verdict according to the evidence.11), appeal denied, 553
A.2d 967 (Pa. 1988).

The trial court's venire voir dire in this

1

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1995) (in a capital
case, the jury may also determine punishment in a bifurcated
proceeding).
11

case

prupeny
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whether any venire member held a particular penalty bias and,
consequently, to ensure that the jury impaneled could reach an
impartial decision unencumbered by irrelevant concerns over the
applicable penalties.

Taylor, 664 P.2d at 447. But cf. Salt

Lake City v. Tuero, 745 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah App. 1987)
(affirming trial court's refusal to allow defendant to voir dire
prospective jurors concerning their opinions of the potential
sentence on the ground it "may invite confusion on the jury's
part as to their proper role in the trial").
Importantly, the trial court did not suggest to the
venire that the impaneled jury could potentially effect any
aspect of the imposition of penalties upon a guilty verdict.
See, e.g., United States v. Davidson, 367 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir.
1966) (held error for trial court to instruct deliberating

jury

that it could recommend leniency in order to avoid a mistrial).
Rather, the court further informed the venire that the impaneled
jury would try the facts only, and that the applicable penalties
were "fixed by law" (R. 17, 34), see addendum A.

So couched, the

trial court's venire voir dire concerning the applicable
penalties cannot reasonably be interpreted to have confused the
subsequently impaneled jury as to their sole fact-finding role.
Based on the above, the trial court's mention of, and
inquiry concerning the potential penalties in this case does not
constitute erroneous instruction, but rather proper venire voir
dire.

Tavlor, 664 P.2d at 447. Defendant has thus failed to
12

establish one of the requirements of the plain error standard and
his claim must fail. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403.
D.

No Obvious Error

For the same reasons that the trial court's voir dire
of the venire does not amount to error, it cannot constitute
obvious error.

Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403.

Further, defendant's

brief is devoid of any controlling authority indicating that a
trial court's voir dire concerning the venire's attitudes on the
potential penalties is always error.

Rather, defendant relies on

Davidson (discussed in part C, supra), which relates to the
potential problems encountered when a trial court formally
instructs an empaneled and/or deliberating jury concerning the
applicable punishments.

Br. of App. at 15-17.

As set forth

above, such is not the case here.
Defendant also points to model jury instructions
developed by the Utah Chapter of the Federal Bar Association to
support his claim of obvious error.

Br. of App. at 19.

Specifically, defendant relies on Federal Bar Association
Criminal Instruction No. 17:
The punishment provided by law for
the offense charged in the indictment
is a matter exclusively within the
province of the Court, and should
never be considered by the jury in
any way in arriving at an impartial
verdict as to the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
Defendant concedes that the instruction "may not be controlling
on the trial court," but asserts that the instruction, "with the
case law--serve[s] to put the court on notice as to the general
13

<

assertion wholly fails to establish how the existence of the
federal model instruction suffices to alert a state trial court
that it is committing obvious

error by informing the jury venire
i

of the prospective penalties, a subject the federal model
instruction does not address.
E.

Curative Instruction Defeats Claim of Prejudice
l

More importantly, defendant fails to point out that the
trial court did in fact instruct the impaneled jury along the
lines of the federal model instruction (R. 78), see addendum A.
i

This failure undermines defendant's claim of prejudice. See,
e.g., State v. Koch, 673 P.2d 297, 304 (Ariz. 1983) (erroneous
penalty instruction that was accompanied by a proper instruction
advising jury that it was not to consider the possible punishment
in reaching its verdict held to defeat claim of prejudice);
United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236, 255 (6th Cir. 1979)
(curative instruction adequate to eliminate any possible
prejudice resulting from court's earlier inadvertent reference to
penalty).

Defendant wholly fails to demonstrate that the court's

subsequent instruction to the impaneled jury that it must ignore
the potential punishments was inadequate to cure any alleged
error.

Thus, in the absence of any indication to the contrary,

the Court must presume the jury followed the trial court's
instruction and did not consider the potential penalties in
arriving at their verdict.

See State v. Reay, 810 P.2d 512, 517

n.6 (Wash. App.) ("A jury is presumed to follow the court's
14

instructions and that presumption will prevail until it is
overcome by a showing otherwise."), review denied, 816 P.2d 1225
(Wash. 1991).
In sum, defendant fails to establish that the trial
court's voir dire constituted error, that the alleged error was
obvious, or that he suffered any unfair prejudice.
reject his claim on any one of these grounds.

The Court may

Menzies, 889 P.2d

at 403.
POINT II
DEFENDANT PAILS TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM
OF PLAIN ERROR REGARDING THE PRECISE
TERMINOLOGY AND ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS
LISTED IN ELEMENTS INSTRUCTIONS ##45; INDEED, ERROR, IF ANY, WAS
FAVORABLE TO DEFENDANT
Defendant claims that elements instructions ##4-5
constitute prejudicial error because they required the jury to
find that counts II and/or III constituted prior violations

of

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a) (Supp. 1995), instead of prior
convictions

of the statute, consistent with the precise

terminology of section 58-37-8 (1) (b).

Br. of App. at 21-25.

Defendant further claims the instructions were erroneously
prejudicial because the jury was instructed that it could not
convict for the drug offenses charged in counts II and/or III,
unless it first convicted defendant for the drug offense charged
in count I as a prior violation of the drug statute.

Br. of App.

at 21-25.
As he did in Point I, supra. defendant acknowledges
that he did not object to the trial court's elements
15

instructions, but claims that the issue is nonetheless properly
before the Court on grounds of plain error.

Br. of App. at 22.

Because defendant fails to demonstrate any error, let alone an
obvious and prejudicial error in the trial court's elements
instructions, his claim should be rejected.

State v. Menzies.

889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah 1994).
A. The Trial Court Properly
Instructed the Jury Using the Term
Violation in Lieu of the Term
Conviction
Section 58-37-8 (1) (b) provides for enhanced penalties
for repeated violations of the subsection (1)(a):
Any person convicted of violating
Subsection (1)(a) with respect to:
(ii) a substance classified in
Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and
upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this
subsection is guilty of a second
degree felony.
Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury that it could
not convict defendant for the drug distribution offense alleged
in count II unless it determined "beyond a reasonable doubt" that
the offense "was a second or subsequent violation occurring after
a previous violation of the same statute" (R. 101) (a copy of
jury instruction #4 is contained in Addendum B ) . The court
similarly instructed the jury concerning the drug distribution
offense alleged in count III, requiring the jury to determine
"beyond a reasonable doubt" that that offense also constituted "a
second or subsequent violation occurring after a previous
16

violation of the same statute" (R. 100)(a copy of jury
instruction #5 is contained in Addendum B ) .
1.

No Demonstration of Error

While it is sometimes desirable for jury instructions
to track the statutory language "as closely as possible," State
v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 755 (Utah 1986), trial courts are not
required to use exact statutory terminology in their jury
instructions.

State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987)

(dismissing as frivolous defendant's claim that instruction
failed to correctly state statutory presumption because the court
used the non-statutory term "fails," instead of the statutory
term "no").

Indeed, it is occasionally error to instruct the

jury according to the strict statutory language.

See, e.g.,

State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 327 (Utah 1985) ("a jury
instruction using the language of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-402(1) is
unconstitutional because it directly relates to the issue of
guilt and relives the State of its burden of proof"); State v.
Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Utah 1986) (same).

Cf. State v.

Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1981) ("it is not erroneous in all
instances to instruct the jury in the language of the statute if
the jury is not likely to be confused or misled").

A more

appropriate concern than whether the instructions precisely track
the use and order of the statutory terminology is whether the
given instructions accurately state the law.

Accordingly,

"beyond the substantive scope, correctness, and clarity of the
jury instructions, their precise wording and specificity is left
17

to the sound discretion of the trial court."

State v. Aly, 782

<

P.2d 549, 550 (UtahApp. 1989),
In the present case, defendant's nominal assertion of
error fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its

(

discretion in using the term violation in lieu of the term
conviction according to the exact phraseology of section 58-378(1)(b), nor has he shown that the instructions did not
accurately state the law.

i

Specifically, defendant claims that

the term conviction as used in section 58-37-8(1) (b) "has a
legally different and more serious--meaning [sic] than does the

<

term 'violation,'" br. of app. at 22-23, but fails to suggest a
definition for either term or to otherwise explain the alleged
difference between the two terms for purposes of section 58-378(1)(b).

Defendant further fails to support his claim of error

with any authority.

See State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249-50

(Utah App. 1992) (declining to reach unsupported argument).
More importantly, the Utah Supreme Court recently
clarified that the term conviction as used in section 58-378(1)(b) means "the determination of guilt by a verdict or plea
rather

than by a judgment

of conviction."

State v. Hunt, No.

940267, slip op. at 4 (Utah November 9, 1995)(emphasis added).
Thus, for purposes of section 58-37-8(1)(b),"a conviction on one
count in an information can be a legal basis for enhancing other
convictions based on counts charged in the same information."
Id.

To construe the term conviction as used in section 58-37-

8(1)(b) according to its other common meaning, denoting "the
18

,

final judgment entered on the plea or verdict," would
"unnecessarily waste judicial resources."

Id.

As noted in

Hunt,"[t]he prosecution could circumvent the multicount
enhancement dilemma simply by charging each count in a separate
information," resulting in three trials, "consuming three times
the resources."
judgment

Id.

In short, Hunt makes clear that a prior

of conviction is not required in order for the penalty

enhancement of section 58-37-8(1)(b) to apply.

Thus, the

instructions are neither incorrect or misleading regarding the
requirements of section 58-37-8(1)(b).

Cf. State v. Lopez, 789

P.2d 39, 45 (Utah App. 1990) (no error in refusing defendant's
requested instruction where instructions given to the jury
"directly parallel the statutory language and correctly instruct
on the applicable law").
2.

No Allegation of Obvious Error

Notwithstanding his failure to demonstrate any error in
the trial court's use of the term violation, defendant's brief is
devoid of any allegation or explication of obvious
Br. of App. at 21-25.

error.

See

This failure by itself constitutes

sufficient grounds for the Court to reject defendant's claim of
plain error regarding the wording of the elements instructions
given.

See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403.
3.

No Demonstration of Prejudice

Defendant's claim of plain error regarding the trial
court's use of the term violation can also be rejected based on
his failure to demonstrate any resultant prejudice.
19

Menzies. 889

P.2d at 403. Defendant's claim of prejudice is based on his
conclusory allegation that the evidence supporting counts I and
II was thin as compared to the evidence supporting count III.
Br. of App. at 24-25.

Accordingly, defendant supposes that

the jury was pondering a 'not guilty'
verdict for Counts I and II, but were
swayed from such a more favorable
result by the language of jury
instruction[s] 4 and 5 which required
a finding of guilt under Count I
before a finding of guilt could be
made under Count[s] II and III.
Br. of App. at 25-26.

Defendant's supposition is based on the

fact that the deliberating jury submitted the following written
question to the trial court:
The 3rd charge, instruction #5, element #7 refers to this char
as a subsequent violation. If count one and count two are 'not
guilty,' can a guilty verdict be given for count 3 [?]
(R. 106) (a copy is contained in Addendum B).

The trial court

responded by writing, "No" on the same piece of paper as the
jury's question and returning it to the deliberating jurors.

Id.

Defendant's claim of prejudice cannot succeed unless it
is presumed that the jury wholly disregarded the trial court's
considerable instructions regarding the reasonable doubt
standard.

Indeed, as noted previously, elements instruction #4

instructed the jury that in order to find defendant guilty for
the offense charged in count I, it "must" find that each of the
essential elements was established beyond a reasonable doubt (R.
102), see addendum B.

Elements instruction #5 similarly

instructed that in order to find defendant guilty of count II,
the jury "must" find that the essential elements, including the
20

fact that count II constituted "a second or subsequent violation
occurring after a previous violation of the same statute" were
established beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 101-02), see addendum
B.

Further, each of the elements instructions for counts I-III

concluded as follows:
If the State has failed to prove to
your satisfaction beyond a reasonable
doubt any one or more of the above
essential elements of the crime
charged, you should find the
defendant not guilty. On the other
hand, if the State has proved beyond
a reasonable doubt all of the
essential elements of the offense as
above set forth, then you should find
the defendant guilty of the charge.
(R. 102-100), see addendum B.
In addition to the foregoing elements instructions, the
trial court explained the significance of circumstantial
evidence, reiterating that "each fact which is essential to
complete a set of circumstance [sic] necessary to establish the
defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each
fact or circumstance upon which such inference necessarily rests
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 85) (a copy is
contained in Addendum B).

Finally, the trial court instructed

the jury as to the definition of reasonable doubt (R. 92) (a copy
is contained in Addendum B).

Defendant does not dispute the

adequacy of the above instructions to inform the jury of the
reasonable doubt standard and/or its duty to hold the State to
that standard in proving each element of its case against
defendant.

Br. of App. at 21-26. Where, as here, a jury is
21

correctly instructed, the Court must presume the jury followed
those instructions.

State v. Enno, 807 P.2d 610, 623 (Idaho

1991) ("Where the jury instructions taken as a whole, correctly
state the law and are not inconsistent, but may be reasonably and
fairly harmonized, it will be assumed that the jury gave due
consideration to the whole charge contained in all the
instructions and was not mislead by any isolated portion
thereof.''); State v. Reay. 810 P.2d 512, 517 n.6 (Wash. App.)
("A jury is presumed to follow the court's instructions and that
presumption will prevail until it is overcome by a showing
otherwise."), review denied, 816 P.2d 1225 (Wash. 1991); Jones v.
State, 764 P.2d 914 (Okl.Cr.App. 1988) ("The presumption is that
jurors are true to their oaths and conscientiously observe their
instructions and admonitions"); State v. Schad, 633 P.2d 366, 377
(Ariz. 1981) ("[T]here is no presumption that jurors will disobey
instructions given them by the court"), cert, denied, 455 U.S.
983 (1982).

Cf. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah 1989)

("Given the erroneous instruction, it is impossible for us to
determine or presume that the jury properly performed its
weighing function."), cert, denied,
(1995).

U.S.

, 116 S.Ct. 163

Defendant makes no contrary argument.
Based on the above, defendant fails to demonstrate

either error or obvious error with reference to the trial court's
use of the term violation in elements instructions ##4-5.
Because he cannot demonstrate that the jury failed to heed the
trial court's instructions concerning the reasonable doubt
22

standard, he further fails to demonstrate any unfair prejudice.
The Court may reject his claim on any one of these grounds.
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403., 850 P.2d at 1208-09.
B. Error, if Any, in Requiring Jury
to Find That Counts II and/or III
Constituted Second or Subsequent
Offenses Was Favorable to Defendant
Defendant's remaining allegation of plain error
regarding instructions ##4-5 rests on the fact that the trial
court instructed the jury that it could not convict defendant for
counts II and III unless it first determined that those offenses
constituted second or subsequent violations of section 58-378(1)(b).

Br. of App. at 23-24.

Defendant suggests that this

determination was a sentencing enhancement to be determined by
the court, not the jury.

Br. of App. at 23. While it may be

more desirable to leave for the trial court the question of
whether a violation constitutes a second or subsequent conviction
for purposes of section 58-37-8(1) (b), the failure to do so does
not constitute grounds for reversal.
1.

No Allegation of Obvious Error

In support of his claim of error, defendant cites case
law interpreting the firearm enhancement statute and holding that
there is no requirement that the jury make a specific finding
that a firearm was used in the commission of a crime before the
sentence can be enhanced under that statute.

In State v. Angus,

the Utah Supreme Court noted that the defendant had made no such
request and that on the facts of that case, such a requirement
would have been "nonsensical." 581 P.2d 992, 995 (Utah 1978).
23

Defendant also points to State v. Labrum, wherein this Court
similarly ruled that any error in not requiring the jury to
specifically find that a firearm was used prior to enhancing
defendant's sentence was "harmless indeed."

881 P.2d 900, 905

(Utah App. 1994). cert, granted on other grounds, 892 P.2d 13
(Utah 1995).
There is nothing in either of the above firearm
enhancement cases that would have suggested to the instant trial
court that its instructions requiring

the jury to find that

counts II and III constituted second or subsequent offenses under
section 58-37-8(1) (b) before it could convict for either offense
was obviously

erroneous.

See Br. of App. at 21-25.

Defendant makes no contrary argument.
Defendant's failure to allege that the

claimed error should have been obvious to the trial court is, as
noted previously, sufficient reason to reject his claim of plain
error.

Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403.
Moreover, in holding that the failure to require a

special jury finding was not error, Angus, 581 P.2d at 995, or at
the most, harmless error, Labrum, 881 P.2d at 905, both cases
suggest that there are circumstances when such a requirement is
proper, e.g., when requested by defendant.
995.

Angus, 581 P.2d at

Significantly, while defendant did not request the instant

elements instructions, he did not object either (R. 161 at T.
424).

For reasons set forth below, defendant's failure to object

below may well have been based on the fact that any error in
instructions ##4-5 was favorable.
24

2.

Favorable Error

Indeed, by requiring the jury to find that counts II
and III constituted second or subsequent violations of the drug
statute before it could convict on either count, the trial court
essentially required the jury to find more elements than actually
required by section 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii)2.

That any error in so

requiring was favorable to defendant is highlighted by the jury's
question as to whether it could convict for count III if it did
not first convict for counts I and II (R. 106), see addendum B.
In responding negatively to the jury's question, the trial court
essentially instructed the jury to acquit defendant of all three
counts if it could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant was guilty as charged in count I.

Id.

If, on the

other hand, the jury had been instructed as now requested by
defendant, excluding any requirement that counts II and III must
constitute second or subsequent violations of section 58-378(1)(a), defendant ran the risk of being convicted for counts II
and III, regardless of the jury's decision to convict or not for
count I.

In short, such an instruction would have made it even

more likely that defendant would be convicted on all three

Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) provides:
Except as authorized by this chapter,
it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally: . . .
distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to
distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance.
25

(Utah 1980) (no ground for reversal where any prejudice caused by
erroneous jury instruction was favorable to the defendant).
Notably, defendant did not object to counts I-III
being tried together, thus requiring the jury to refer back to
and convict defendant for count I before it could convict him for
count II and/or count III did not require the jury to consider
any uncharged conduct that it would not otherwise be entitled to
consider.

See, e.g.. State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah

1989) (interpreting homicide statute as requiring a bifurcated
proceeding when underlying homicide charge is subject to sentence
enhancement based on separately

charged crimes or bad acts).

See

also Hunt, No. 940267, slip op. at 4 (holding that a conviction
on the first count of an information under drug statute may serve
as the basis for enhancing the penalty on subsequent counts
''irrespective of the timing of the offenses or the employment of
a separate or multicount information").
Based on the above, defendant demonstrates no obvious
nor unfavorable error regarding the requirement in elements
instructions ##4-5 that the offenses charged in counts II and III
must constitute second or subsequent violations of the drug
statute.

He thus fails to demonstrate plain error and his claim

should be rejected.

Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403.
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POINT III
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL
Even though errors may not individually warrant
reversal, this Court may still reverse where the errors
cumulatively undermine confidence in the outcome.

State v.

Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 350 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95
(Utah 1993).

Defendant claims that the trial court's alleged

errors in the voir dire of the jury venire, and the wording of
elements instructions ##4-5, including the added element that
counts II-III must constitute second or subsequent violations of
section 58-37-8(1) (a) , together constitute cumulative error.
Defendant's claim fails for two reasons.
First, defendant fails to adequately support his claim
of cumulative error.

He merely asserts that if the individual

errors do not warrant reversal, then the cumulative effect of
them does, but he provides no meaningful explanation of why this
is so.

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d

1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to reach the merits of the
defendant's state constitutional challenge because defendant
failed to provide any supporting legal authority or analysis).
Rather, defendant reasserts the individual claims of error and
merely speculates as to the possible cumulative prejudicial
effect.
Second, for the reasons argued above, no unfavorable
error exists in this case.

Indeed, defendant's assertion of

cumulative error cannot succeed unless he first establishes that
27

some error occurred.

maimer, oou r.za at. :ou,
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detailed in Point I, supra. defendant fails to establish any
error in the trial court's venire voir dire. Nor has he
established any error in the trial court's use of the term
violation in elements instructions ##4-5.
supra.

See Point 11(A),

To the extent there was any error in the number of

elements listed in instructions ##4-5, that error is not
1

reversible either alone or cumulatively because it was favorable
to defendant.

See Point 11(B), supra. Because the actions about

which defendant complains, if erroneous, were favorably so, the
Court need not consider whether the cumulative effect of these
actions undermines confidence in the outcome.

Palmer, 86 0 P.2d

at 350 (finding that the trial record contained numerous
i

individually harmless errors before concluding that the
cumulative effect undermined confidence in the outcome).3
POINT IV
i

DEFENDANT WAS EFFECTIVELY ASSISTED BY
TRIAL COUNSEL
As an alternative means for reviewing on appeal the
above claimed errors concerning the trial court's venire voir
dire and elements instructions ##4-5, defendant asserts that he
was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel.
3

Br. of

Defendant has withdrawn his former Point III, see
Supp. Br. of App. filed on November 1, 1995, including his claim
that the alleged cumulative prejudicial effect of the above
claimed errors would have been "obvious" if the non-presiding
judge who responded to the jury's written question had notified
the parties before responding to the question. Compare Br. of
App. at 34 and Supp. Br. of App. at 2-3. See also (Supp. R. 173180) .
28

App. at 35-38,

In reviewing a claim of counsel ineffectiveness,

this Court indulges a "strong presumption" that counsel's conduct
fell within the "wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy."

State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818,

822 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 689 (1955)), cert, granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).

To

succeed under this alternative theory, defendant must demonstrate
that trial counsel performed deficiently, or that counsel's
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,"
and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the trial
outcome.

Id.
This Court has recognized that "plain error" and

"ineffective assistance" claims, raised for the first time on
appeal, share "a common standard."

State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d

170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,
124 n.15 (Utah 1989)).

Indeed, to be successful under either

theory defendant must demonstrate prejudice or a substantial
likelihood of a more favorable outcome absent the plain error
and/or the deficient performance of trial counsel.

Id.

A

defendant who fails to meet the plain error requirement of
prejudice likewise fails to meet the required showing under the
ineffective assistance of counsel standard.

Id.

Because the

plain error and counsel effectiveness tests so closely resemble
one another, and for brevity's sake, the State's plain error
29

analysis' of the issues raised in Points I-II of defendant's
brief apply here.

Indeed, this Court "may choose not to consider

the adequacy of counsel's performance" if it determines that the
claimed errors in Points I-II of defendant's brief were not
harmful.

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1227 (Utah 1993).
In any event, for the same reasons that the trial

court's venire voir dire did not constitute error, trial counsel
did not perform deficiently by not raising an objection.
Point 1(C), supra.

See

Additionally, for the same reasons that

elements instructions ##4-5 did not constitute either incorrect
or misleading instruction, trial counsel did not perform
deficiently when he did not object thereto.
supra.

See, Point 11(A),

Finally, for reasons set forth in Point 11(B), supra, any

error resulting from the additional requirements in instructions
##4-5 that the jury could not convict for counts II and/or III
without first convicting for count I was favorable to defendant.
Consequently, trial counsel exercised sound trial strategy by not
objecting to the above claimed errors.

Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225.

In short, defendant fails to make out ineffective
assistance of counsel for the same reasons he failed to establish
plain error.

His claims of ineffective assistance should be

rejected.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the above, this case presents no grounds for
reversal and the Court should affirm defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this P

day of December, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

you stand again, raise your right hand. And the
clerk of the court is going to administer a
second oath to you for that purpose. If you'll
all stand, please.
THE CLERK:

Raise your right hands,

please.
You and each of you do solemnly swear that
you will true answers make to such questions as
shall be put to you touching your qualifications
to serve as jurors in the case now pending
before the Court so help you God.
(Whereupon, the trial jurors nodded and/or
spoke in the affirmative.)
THE COURT:

Thank you.

you that this is a drug case.

I've advised

And I will, on

the record once again, advise you of the nature
of the charges involved.
Counsel, have there been any amended
criminal informations filed since the initial
information?
MR. TAYLOR:

I don't believe so, Your

Honor.
MR. ZABRISKIE:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

Then it's the State of

Utah V Juan Anthony Portillo.

Lesley Nelson -- CSR

Count 1 is distribution or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance*

That's a

third-degree felony. That's punishable by
incarceration in the Utah State Prison for an
indeterminate period of time, not to exceed five
years, together with up to a $5,000 fine and/or
both-MR. TAYLOR:

Your Honor, may we

approach the bench briefly?
THE COURT:

Yes.

( Off the record at the bench, not
reported.)
MR. TAYLOR:

For the record, the State

moves to amend the information in Count 4.

It

is charged as a second-degree felony, which
should have been charged as a third-degree
felony.

It's not a substantive change, merely

changes that one number.
MR. ZABRISKIE:

No objections, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Very well.

Back to the criminal charge*

Count 2,

ladies and gentlemen, is distribution of or
arranging to distribute a controlled substance.
That's a second-degree felony. It's also

Lesley Nelson -- CSR

punishable by an indeterminate time at the Utah
State Prison, not less than one nor more than 15
years in the Utah State Prison, together with up
to a $10,000 fine and/or both.
Count 3 is distribution of or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance, also a
second-degree felony.

It would carry a maximum,

also, for an indeterminate time, not less than
one nor more than 15 years in the Utah State
Prison together with a fine not to exceed
$10,000 and/or both.
Count 4 is possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to distribute.

That's

a third-degree felony, carrying the possible
imposition of an indeterminate time from zero to
five years in the Utah State Prison together
with a fine up to $5,000 and/or both.
Count 5 is unlawful possession or use of
drug paraphenalia.
misdemeanor.

That's a class-B

It's punishable by incarceration

in the Utah County Jail for a period not to
exceed six months together with a fine up to
$1,000 and/or both.
And Count 6 is illegal drug tax.
third-degree felony.

That's a

That's also punishable by

Lesley Nelson -- CSR

an indeterminate time in the Utah State Prison
not to exceed five years together with a fine up
to $5,000 and/or both.
You, as jurors, will be the triers of the
fact-- its sole and exclusive triers of the fact
and make a determination in this case what the
facts are. Ultimately this Court will advise you
what the law is and the proper application of
that a law.

But the facts are your sole and

exclusive domain.
You'll be required to listen very closely
and listen to evidence that is presented and
testimony that's given, and make, ultimately, a
determination about credibility of witnesses and
who is to believe-- be believed in this case.
We'll conduct what we call now voir dire.
It's the opportunity for the Court to make some
inquiry.
And, first of all, I believe what I will do
is I'll have each of you stand, advise the Court
of your name, the city of your residence-- not
your street address-- and then advise, for the
record, where you work, if you do work, whether
or not you're married or not, and whether your
spouse works.

And then we'll follow up with

'Lesley Nelson -- CSR

had any other basis upon which you might have
some knowledge of this case, any notoriety
whatsoever?
(No audible response.)
THE COURT:

Has anyone ever been an

adverse party to the defendant in a civil case
or any proceeding?

Is there anyone that

believes that the punishment fixed by law is too
severe or too light for the offenses charged?
(No audible response.)
THE COURT:

Is there any reason best

known to yourself why you could not try the case
fairly and impartially upon the evidence and
without any bias or prejudice for or against
either party?
(No audible response.)
THE COURT:

If you were a party to this

action-- either the plaintiff, the State of
Utah, or the defendant, Mr. Portillo-- would you
be fully satisfied to have your cause tried by a
person of your present attitude and frame of
mind towards this case?
(No audible response.)
THE COURT:

Is there anyone that

because of medical or mental or emotional

Lesley Nelson
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In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss
nor consider the subject of penalty or punishment, as that is a
matter which lies with the court, and other court proceedings. The
penalty and punishment for the crime charged must not in any way
affect your decision as to the guilty or innocence of the

lf/s*t

defendant.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

In order for you to find the defendant guilty of the
offense of Count I: Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a
Controlled Substance you must find that each of the following
essential elements of the crime charged in the Information have
been established beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

That the defendant,

2.

On or about October 9, 1991,

3.

In Utah County, Utah,

4.

Did knowingly and intentionally,

5.

Distribute or agree, consent, offer, or arrange to

distribute,
6.

Marijuana.

If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction
beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the above essential
elements of the crime charged, you should find the defendant not
guilty.

On the other hand, if the State has proved beyond a

reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense as
above set forth, then you should find the defendant guilty of the
charge.

INSTRUCTION NO.

V

In order for you to find the defendant guilty of the
offense of Count II: Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a
Controlled Substance you must find that each of the following
essential elements of the crime charged in the Information have
been established beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

That the defendant,

2.

On or about October 15, 1991,

3.

In Utah County, Utah,

4.

Did knowingly and intentionally,

5.

Distribute or agree, consent, offer, or arrange to

distribute,
6.

Marijuana,

7.

That this distribution was a second or subsequent

violation occurring after a previous violation of the same
statute.

If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction
beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the above essential
elements of the crime charged, you should find the defendant not
guilty.

On the other hand, if the State has proved beyond a

reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense as
above set forth, then you should find the defendant guilty of the
charge.

INSTRUCTION NO. t>

In order for you to find the defendant guilty of the
offense of Count III: Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute
a Controlled Substance you must find that each of the following
essential elements of the crime charged in the Information have
been established beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

That the defendant,

2.

On or about October 25, 1991,

3.

In Utah County, Utah,

4.

Knowingly and intentionally,

5.

Distribute or agree, consent, offer, or arrange to

distribute,
6.

Marijuana,

7.

That this distribution was a second or subsequent

violation occurring after a previous violation of the same
statute.

If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction
beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the above essential
elements of the crime charged, you should find the defendant not
guilty.

On the other hand, if the State has proved beyond a

reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense as
above set forth, then you should find the defendant guilty of the
charge.

100

v

r•
INSTRUCTION

f

'

The burden of proof described as "beyond a reasonable
doubt H is used and/or referred to in several places in these
Instructions.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require

proof to be an absolute certainty.

A reasonable doubt is based

on reason and common sense and not on speculation or imagination.
It is a doubt that is reasonable in view of all the evidence.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must satisfy the mind and
convince those who are bound to act conscientiously upon such
proof.

A reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable men and

women would hold after consideration of the evidence or lack of
evidence in the case.

INSTRUCTION NO- 2-°
However, a finding of a guilty as to any crime may not be
based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances
are not only (1) consistent with the theory that the defendant is
guilty of the crime, but (2) cannot be reconciled with any other
rational conclusion.
Further, each fact which is essential to complete a set of
circumstance necessary to establish the defendant's guilt must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance upon
which such inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Also, if the circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two
reasonable interpretations, onfof which points to the defendant's
guilt and the other to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt that
interpretation which points to the defendant's innocence, and
reject that interpretation which points to his guilt.
If, on the other hand one interpretation of such evidence
appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be
unreasonable, it would be your duty to accept the reasonable
interpretation and to reject the unreasonable.

:•
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

58-37-8

(10) Any person who obtains or attempts to obtain information from the
database by misrepresentation or fraud is guilty of a third degree felony.
(11) (a) A person may not knowingly and intentionally use, release, publish,
or otherwise make available to any other person or entity any information
obtainedfromthe database for any purpose other than those specified in
Subsection (8). Each separate violation of this subsection is a third degree
felony and is also subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $5,000.
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of this subsection
shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-108, regarding adjudicative
proceedings within the division.
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection shall be deposited in
the General Fund.
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit information to the
database as required under this section after the division has submitted a
specific written request for the information or when the division determines the individual has a demonstrable pattern of failing to submit the
information as required is groundsforthe division to take the following
actions in accordance with Section 58-1*401:
(i) refuse to issue a license to the individual;
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license;
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation the license;
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the individual;
(v) issue a cease and desist order, and
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for each
dispensed prescription regarding which the required information is
not submitted.
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (aXvi) shall be deposited
in the General Fund.
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of this subsection
shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-108, regarding adjudicative
proceedings within the division.
(18) An individual who has submitted information to the database in
accordance with this section may not be held civilly liable for having submitted
the information.
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to establish and
operate the database shall be funded by appropriationsfromthe General
Fund.
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated without the use of any
resources within the Commerce Service Fund.
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting data as required in
tins section shall be assumed by the submitting drug outlet.
Hirforr C 1S6S, 8M7.7A, enacted by L.
1I9S, eh. aSS, I a.

Effective Dates. — Ltwt 1995, eh. S33,14
mskat the set tfftctm <m July 1,1995.

58-37-8. P r o h i b i t e d acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acta A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;

58-37-8
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(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed
practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute,
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directlyfroma practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not
concealedfromthose present; however, a person may not be convicted
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so;
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes
of this subsection, a juvenile
means a 'child* as defined in Section
78-3a*2, and 'emergency9 means any physical condition requiring the
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain
or suffering;

